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CRITICISM OF KANT'S MAIN PRINCIPLES.¹

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IF we suppose it to result (from the foregoing¹) that Kant's schemata, as simply so many self-deceptions, must be held to vanish, we may suppose, also, that Kant himself—seeing that, for reception of the contributions of special sense, there can now no longer be question of any *a priori* system of forms, half-sensuous and half-intellectual—would admit his whole transcendental enterprise to have failed. In view of Kant's own perfect honesty, we may really allow ourselves to suppose this. It does not follow, however, that others (Sir W. Hamilton, for instance), who opine Kant's causality to be just a separate and peculiar mental principle, would be disposed to sympathize with as much. They know nothing of the schematism; for them the categories alone exist; and they have no thought but to place these in direct contact with sense. We may safely assume their possible contention to be insufficient, however, and Kant's conjectural admission to be alone tenable.

My second main objection, now, to the Kantian theory of perception concerns the empirical facts which, *through* the schema,

¹ The reference is to the preceding portion of this article published in the July (1880) number of this Journal.—[Ed.

are to be subsumed *under* the category, *into* self-consciousness. I assert that these facts—what to Kant are the *Erscheinungen*—already possess, and must possess, and by Kant (especially in the case of causality) are admitted to possess, that very necessity (of order or otherwise), which alone it is the business and the use of the category to bestow. Kant, to be sure, names this necessity only “subjective,” and still thinks it necessary to call in his peculiar “epigenesis” in order that it may become “objective.” The verbal distinction, however, nowise effaces the actual facts; and these are such that, on Kant’s own terms, his *epigenesis* is a *hypergenesis* that explains nothing. There are twelve categories for the subsumption into consciousness of (to say so) as many sense-successions. The latter, it is to be conceived, differing as the former differ, are respectively to be subsumed, each under each. Those are the rules (II., 139); these are the cases. One form of judgment is *determined* rather than another (III., 66); and the *grounds of determination* are the *empirical circumstances* (II., 737). No sense-succession but must blow its particular category’s own whistle, ring that category’s own bell.

We shall take the categories in their order now, and examine them as they come; only, we shall omit modality as before; do little more than briefly indicate in regard to the rest; and reserve our main discussion for causality alone. For we consider always that causality is in every way the decisive and the master category, as well as this, that what objection founds on the empirical facts was, in our first article, scarcely more than suggested; it was only touched upon.

But we shall advert, first, for a moment to what Kant calls pure perception, space and time. This, too, is an essential part of his doctrine; and without it, also, that doctrine goes at once to the ground. Kant will have it that space (time likewise) is not an independent entity there in itself and on its own account without us, but a form from within which *we* throw into things, not *they* into us; and his arguments are excellent. Nevertheless, they are inadequate and erroneous. Space is involved in every special case of external perception; but it does not follow that *therefore* it is not a cognition acquired from without, but only an *a priori* form projected from within. Suppose actual external bodies in an actual external space really to exist, then sight tutored by touch, or touch

tutored by sight, is perfectly adequate to bring us, otherwise constituted as we are, to a complete *perception* of them in the usual understanding of the word. In fact, there is no doubt at all, that space and the bodies in space are precisely such actualities; and just as little that the cognition or perception of them is so acquired. As for the apodictic evidence of the relations of space which is the burden of Kant's other argument here, it is not necessary to have recourse to an *a priori* source for that either. Indeed, how *can* mere *a priori* explain necessity? It may be that (though not yet proved) the *a posteriori cannot* be necessary, but it does not follow thence that the *a priori must* be necessary. The light of evidence is as much wanted in the latter case as in the former, and the mere position by no means extends it. The truth is that the apodictic evidence of the relations of space issues from the very nature of space, and not from its position, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori* (though the latter is undoubtedly the fact). Space, namely, is the *generalè* or common universal of all forms of externality as forms of externality; and, all relations that belong to it, it imposes upon them. Further, space itself is externality as externality; and, simply as being such, all its relations bring with them the very necessity *of* externality as externality. These relations, in a word, are consequences from the very *notion* of externality as externality; and as such consequences they necessarily share in all the necessities of their primitive and parent notion *as a thought that must be thought*. Having said this on space, special reference to time is not called for; and what has been said will, generally, suffice for the present. We return to the categories.

And what, on the whole, is to be said here is this. The use of the categories at all is to account for the fact of necessity and objectivity being in existence. But the expedient is supererogatory and gratuitous. Necessity and objectivity as much are, or are as much given, as the contributions of special sense are, or as the contributions of special sense are given. As special sense is there, they are there; and we have simply to receive them, or we have simply to apprehend them.

To refer specially, the whole result of the category of quantity is the *axiom*, "All perceptions are extensive magnitudes." Kant, indeed, talks of axioms (in the plural) here, and calls this proposi-

tion only the "principle" of such. But, axiom or principle, it stands alone as the result of the category of quantity. He also exemplifies it by such an object as a house. Now, Kant would grant that a house has in this respect no advantage over any one of its component stones, or, as it may be, bricks. Before I can apprehend that stone as a stone, or that brick as a brick, am I to suppose, then, that a mysterious spectrum from within my own mind must, first of all, throw itself, fusingly, into it? That is accurately, and fully, and truly, Kant's supposition. Common sense says at once No. That stone, that brick, is really as much its own in its quantity as it is its own in its weight or hardness. That stone or that brick has really its quantity in externality to me, and in independence of me, as it has its solidity in externality to me, and in independence of me. The objection that the color, heat, etc., are in me and not in the object is really inapplicable. The true theory of perception finds the primary qualities in the object, and correctly ascribes the secondary qualities to the same object as their cause. I really am so endowed that I come to apprehend the stone or the brick, and truly to apprehend the stone or the brick, as the red or gray, large or small, rough or smooth thing it is out there in space, absolutely on its own account, and quite independent of me. It is not I that give it its quantity. On the contrary, I have to take its quantity simply as it itself gives it me. Kant, of course, never assumed to give the stone or brick its *special* quantity, but only its general quantity, or its capability of manifesting quantity at all. That question of special quantity (a difficulty in the Kantian scheme that I have not yet seen handled)—that question of *special* quantity, I do not boggle at; I take only what quantity Kant allows me, and I say the stone or the brick brings with it that quantity quite in the same way as it brings with it that hardness, solidity, etc. Of course, fully to discuss this, one would require to be agreed as regards the theory of perception as perception. That, plainly, we cannot possibly assume here. But still, in independence of every theory, I can assert that, whatever quality I get from the stone as the stone, or the brick as the brick, quite in the same way I get from it its quantity also. The supposition of a special faculty (or category) within me to give me that quality, or whatever else it may be named, is gratuitous and idle.

And as much as this we can say, not generally only, but on Kant's own terms. Space, for example, being on those terms quantity itself, pure quantity, and in a *a priori* possession, or native clutch of the mind, to what end still postulate a *faculty* of quantity? Why endow us, not only with an innate *object*, but actually with an innate *notion* of it, as though the one being given, and given to a mind, the other were not, even so, a necessary and irresistible consequence? Is it possible that a mind can have the self of an object without at the same time the notion of it? Did we possess the object *a posteriori*, Kant would have no hesitation in styling its notion a derivative; why should *a priori* possession make any difference in this respect? It is still an object there for inspection of the mind, which, indeed, as having it in its own direct naked clutch, ought all the more readily to come to the notion of it. Kant says himself (754), "just the same synthetic unity which space is, has, abstraction being made from the *form* of space, its seat in the mind, and is the category of the synthesis of the *homogeneous*;" and the question is, why so unnecessarily supererogate? One can see pretty plainly, too, that, once in space, the stone or the brick possesses synthesis of the homogeneous in its own right; each is but a synthesis of the homogeneous. And one wonders how, for recognition of this, one requires, over and above the usual perceptive agencies, a special category.

As regards the category of quality, it promises us a positive "anticipation" of actual sense-perception. Accordingly one lays one's self out for something very definite this time, for some actual object, or, at least, for some smallest spang or spangle of an actual object. It is disappointing, then, instead of that to receive only this, "sensation has degree." Surely, we think, if the possession of an actual special *a priori* faculty can tell us no more than that, it is there for very little purpose. On Kant's own terms, indeed, seeing that he allows us sensation in time, we cannot see how, for the cognition in question, more should be required. We have already there all the elements that can possibly be wanted to convey it.

If quantity and quality seem thus of undeniably empirical origin, it is not otherwise with substance or with reciprocity. When I think of a certain waterfall that is sometimes large and sometimes small, sometimes gray and sometimes brown, sometimes with stones

in it and sometimes with leaves, it does not seem to me that, besides observation and comparison, I require a special faculty to enable me to think of the fall of water as permanent element, while the others incidentally vary. Again, the sun, moon, and earth mutually interact, and I am aware of it. I understand all the consequent variety of light, and shade, and form. But then I could evidently learn that from the things themselves; there is no occasion that I should be taught it beforehand. It is, once more, not I that give it to them, but they that give it to me. It is of themselves that sun, and moon, and earth act and react on each other. They did so in the time of Thales, thousands of years before I was born; and they did so in the time of Menes, thousands of years before Thales was born. Beyond all doubt, indeed, they did so even before Adam; and beyond all doubt, also, they might continue to do so were the last son of Adam dead. It is common knowledge that Kant, or, let alone Kant, Berkeley, would conceive himself free to use this very same language. We know that, and the grounds of it. But the question is, not what he might or would say (any man may say what he likes), but could he *consistently* say so, or are the grounds sufficient? The word *ideal* by which he would rescue his consistency is precisely his inconsistency; for the qualities, powers, or what-not in regard are really in the empirical facts from these facts themselves, and not ideally from us.

Once again, the grounds of determination (what category shall act, that is) are the empirical circumstances themselves (737), and that, too, on Kant's own terms. This we have to see now finally in regard to causality.

We say here at once, then, that the grounds of determination, the whistle that calls, the bell that rings, with the result of the one category causality starting up and asserting itself—these already are necessity, and this necessity is wholly independent of the category itself. The category itself *can* act only when it finds a sense-succession to suit—a sense-succession, namely, that is already “subjected to a rule,” “a realè, on which, whenever it is, something else *always* ensues.” Is this to explain the necessity that is present in causality, then? Even for action of his objective necessity, Kant is obliged to presuppose and postulate a no less stringent subjective necessity; and it is expected of us as well to accept one necessity in explanation of another as to admit that the

name subjective wholly vitiates the one, while the name objective as completely establishes the other.

The probability is, as I have said, that Kant, though he worked for long in good faith, and quite blind to this difficulty, did, in the end, awake to it. "Like pain under an opiate," it lies uneasily in his consciousness all through the second analogy, in which he seems perpetually turning back, as it were, to reassure his own self by repetition of the assertion that necessity cannot lie in what is *a posteriori*, and must be given to it by what is *a priori*. And yet "the realè, on which, whenever it is, something else *always* ensues," that is to be the bell that rings in the category—an *a posteriori* necessity that is itself a necessity to the *a priori*! Kant tells us (III., 6) that Hume's question was, "How can we think something so constituted that, if it be given, something else must thereby also be necessarily given?" To answer this question, then, Kant's very first step is to assume a "realè on which, whenever it is, something else always ensues according to a general rule." Kant's very first step is to assume the problem! And for this assumption the only reason offered is, that the assumption is simply necessary; we must assume "conditions of all possible experience." Should we ask further, indeed, as to the reason *why* we must so assume, there can be no answer but, To fill the category—the category would be empty else—if the explanation is to explain, the assumption is to be assumed.

Kant's exclusive work has been already described. Roused to curiosity, he inquired into the possibility of an element of necessity being still present to a world which, in validity, substance, and place, is only contingent and subjective. Now, strange as it may seem, it is even his success in this inquiry that has caused his failure. Not, of course, that the success could really be success, if the failure is really failure. "I tried, therefore, first or all," he says (III., 9), "whether Hume's objection could not be made general, and soon found that the notion of cause and effect is, by a great deal, not the only one by means of which the understanding thinks *a priori* for itself connections in things, rather that metaphysic out and out consists of such." That is, he speedily got into the center of the vast and majestic fane which he saw rise around him for reason—pure reason, organically distributed, organically complete—and almost directly lost sight of causality it-

self. He pleased himself with dreams of system—dreams of an absolute system, guaranteed by an absolute architectonic principle. Absorbed in such dreams, then, it was not wonderful that he was long of coming to see that it was the very first piece of all in his machinery that would not shut into it. The relation was such a specific one, that it obstinately remained impracticable to any *a priori*, whether of time, or function, or general rule, at the same time that its facts were of such a nature that they asserted their own autonomy, and refused to merge themselves in a foreign dominion, of however splendid a name, of which plainly they stood in no need. But if uneasy conscience or consciousness, on Kant's part, only led to never-ending assertion and assertion in the *Kritik*, we must acknowledge quite wakeful attempts at remedy in the *Prolegomena*.

The two judgments are what is most direct and express in this reference. "Empirical judgments, so far as they have objective validity, are," it is said (III., 58), "*judgments of experience*;" but those, again, that are only subjectively valid, I name mere *judgments of sensible perception*. The latter require no pure notion of understanding (category), but only the logical connection of the perception in a thinking subject. The former, however, besides the presentations of sensible perception, require always further special notions *originally generated in the understanding*, which just make it that the judgment of experience is *objectively valid*." Now, we have only to be able fairly to realize the full scope of every moment in this one passage, to be able thoroughly to understand, also, Kant's whole categorical scheme, or, as I name it, theory of perception. We have to consider, first, our apprehension of sensible impression. To that we are always passive; it is a material *a posteriori*, and we have always to wait for it. It is also always in apprehension a breadth or multiple of parts; or, so long as it is only sensuous, it is merely, so to speak, a blur of parts of impression within us, which parts present as yet no fixed order in themselves, but are only, so far, an indifferent succession. That they should, however, be a succession in my internal faculty of sensation, in my internal apprehension, presupposes *time*. This is the *second* movement. My sense-faculty, besides being able to feel, is only able to *feel in time*, which (time) is simply a law, a form attached from the first to my faculty of *internal* sense, as space

again is a form, or spectrum, or potential disc, attached from the first to my faculty of *external* sense. I can only have sensations within, and the time and space into which they are received are necessarily also within, are but original appendices of my own faculties within. But, further now, a *third* consideration is that the empirical breadth—the multiple constituted by my received impressions of sense—is a *variety*: all impressions and all groups of impressions are not alike. All grouping or connecting of impressions in apprehension is, however, always *in the first instance* subjective merely.¹ It is, in the *fourth* place, only in consequence of the multiple in the subjective cognition being subsumed under a category that it becomes objectively valid; that is, an object in actual experience. Kant goes on to explain “that all our judgments (cognitions) are first of all mere judgments (cognitions) of sensible perception, and that, so far, they concern only ourselves, only each one's individual subject: it is only afterwards that we give them a new nexus (in the judgment or cognition of experience), the nexus to an object, namely, in that we will them to be valid, not only occasionally, and not only for us, but always, and for everybody.” What causes the impressions in us is utterly unknown, and never asked for by us: what is an object to us is the blur of special sense received into, and further manipulated by, our own internal *a priori* conditions of a possible experience, which conditions are sensuous for the reception, and intellectual for the further manipulation.

Kant now proceeds to some illustrations. That the room is warm, sugar sweet, wormwood bitter, these he calls judgments only subjectively valid. And he admits that, referring to formed objects (room, sugar, wormwood), they are not good examples of his own first mere subjective impressions that are there *in preparation for* objects, even such objects as room, sugar, and wormwood themselves; but he uses them only to make intelligible what he means by a subjective validity. Such mere feelings (bitterness, sweetness, etc.), are not only subjective at first—they

¹ In his letter to Tieftrunk (XI., 184), Kant denies that combination can, as such, be *perceived*, unless preceded by a category; but, on his own showing, the sun rising, a stone warms, which is itself a combination, and a combination whose “*Wahrgenommenseyn*” or “*Angenommenseyn*” must, even in his eyes, necessarily precede action of the very category!

are subjective at first and last, and no category whatever could make objects of them. But very different is the case when certain subjective impressions, united in the judgment of sensible perception, are finally raised into the judgment of experience. The atmosphere is elastic. The judgment "sugar is sweet" is mine—it may not be yours, or his, or anybody else's—it may not be even mine at all times; but the judgment "the air is elastic" is a judgment valid, not only for me, and for me at certain times, but valid always, and not always for me only, but always for everybody: the former as a subjective judgment, the latter objective.

By way of reason for this remarkable difference in facts of experience that seem at first sight situated alike, Kant points out that subjective judgments "express only a relation of two sensations to the same subject, namely myself, and that, too, only in my state of perception for the time," while objective judgments "connect two sensations with each other, and this connection stands under a condition which makes it universally valid." He further distinctly implies also that even the *subjective* state in the one case differs from the subjective state in the other. There is an *always* and a *not for me only* in the latter case that is not in the former, though *both* are subjective. Of course, Kant so mixes up the two states (which are *both* present in the objective process), in such manner that we cannot assert him *explicitly* to admit as much as that. Still, as much as that is really implied in the very evidence of the sense-impressions themselves. This is a very interesting point, and one regrets that, once coming up to it, Kant should have been contented to handle it with such a half consciousness. He is aware that the judgment, sugar is sweet, connects two impressions with my subject, while the contrasting judgment again, "the air is elastic," connects two impressions with each other. He is also aware, but more dimly perhaps, that the impressions in the one case convey, even subjectively, very different evidence from what they convey in the other. The latter point he would probably have slurred over with the remark that empirical matter certainly differs from empirical matter, and we must just take it as it comes. The former point, too, we may say, though there is a difference between the facts (in the one case two sensations related to me, in the other related to each other) and their evidence, he leaves even so. Just such is the constitution of the

different impressions made on me. One can see, however, that both points are very worthy of inquiry. It is, in fact, consideration of the one point, the difference of evidence while even still in the mere state of subjective impression, that leads me to object to Kant the indispensable dictation, the imperative necessity, of the simple impressions in every case of causality.

Again, the other point is equally interesting. The impression room is followed in me by the impression warmth, and the impression fire is followed by the impression warm room. Why should these two cases, apparently so very much alike, be at the same time so very different that the one founds an objective judgment and the other only a subjective one? They are both cases of causality. The room is as much cause of warmth in me as the fire is cause of warmth in the room. The *rationale* is really that mentioned, but not followed out by Kant. The room is only warm to me, and it is, at the same time, not *always* warm to me. The fire, again, warms not me (at least that relation apart for the nonce) but the room; and the fire is found *always* to warm the room.

We see here, then, a door opened to the element of difference in the sense-successions themselves. Not all impressions, but only some certain ones, are calculated to become in the end objects, while others, differently constituted, remain, and must remain, subjective. Of course, Kant (737) postulates empirical difference for his different categories and cases quite as we may do. Still we object that, at least for long, he remained blind to the full significance of what we may call empirical dictation, especially in causality. We object this generally, and, in particular, we regret that, brought up to such a difference as between sugar-sweetness and air-elasticity, he was not arrested by it, but only mentioned and did not stop to investigate so striking a fact. One almost feels, in fact, from the bare premises, that no satisfactory general theory, such as Kant proposed, could be constructed, did it omit to show what difference of validity lay in the mere difference of impression. The perception of this neglect on the part of Kant opens for us, as said, a wide door of remark—so wide a door, indeed, that, had Kant seen it, it might have given *exit*—exit, namely, into a whole infinite, absolute, external universe. For it is by due inspection of our various materials of sensation and perception that externality as externality is seen to be a fact.

But we must confine ourselves here to what influence the neglect in question exercised on the fortunes of Kant in reference to causality. And that was that he ignored or did not explicitly recognize this, that the sense-impressions, which were adapted for action of the category of causality, already contained *in themselves*, and actually *manifested*, a certain *order*, which order was the signal, clew, or cue, on hint of which it was that the category struck in—on hint of which it was only that the category *could* strike in. It is here, I say, that, despite his subjective judgment, we are to find the precise distinction, contact with the edge of which is Kant's fatality. This edge, as I have said, Kant only missed seeing for long because he had shut himself into *the whole problem*. This whole problem, namely, rose so very soon complete around him that he speedily lost sight of the specialty he started with. Still, it is to be suspected that this edge showed at last to Kant. Suddenly, to his horror (we may surmise) he found that causality would not tuck in and comport itself like the rest.

The cause lay in the *order* of the sense-impressions. In quantity and quality, for example, no exact order, so far as sense was concerned, occurred to give pause; but here such order was a necessary one; for, plainly, unless there was an order A B, the category of causality, which was a necessary A B of antecedent and consequent, would not find its *analogous* sense-multiple to subsume—the rule would not find its case. All through the respective portion of the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, Kant, according to our theory, had uneasily rather felt than seen this difficulty; and so it is that he keeps on asserting and asserting, in every paragraph and in every sentence of his second analogy, that no mere sense-order *can* contain necessity, that such validity can be due, and must be due, only to the action of an intellectual principle from within. In the *Prolegomena*, again, the difficulty, perhaps, is not now only felt; it appears to be seen also, and it is attempted to be set aside (as said) by the word "subjective." There shall be now, namely, even in the sense-element, already a certain fixed order; but this order shall be subjective only, and it shall still be the category makes it objective. It is this he would seem to seek to bring out when he contrasts the propositions, the room is warm, sugar sweet, wormwood bitter, with the other proposition that the air is elastic. Merely so mentioned, it is

something of a difficulty precisely to see how the elasticity of the air fits into the problem of causality. But what Kant means, doubtless, is the ordinary experiment or experiments that establish the proposition. I compress a bag of air, and it yields into a dint; I cease to compress, and the dint fills up. The elasticity of the air is the causal antecedent to which the change in both cases is to be ascribed. The difference we see here is, as already pointed out, that, in the three propositions, the nexus referred wholly to a feeling in ourselves; whereas in the fourth proposition, on the contrary, the nexus has no mere feeling under it, but is now figured as between object and object—a dint follows compression, etc. Here, plainly, is more than any mere feeling in the mind: here are sense-impressions that come to me always in a certain fixed relation among their own selves. What we call A in that relation is always first, what we call B, again, is always second; or the order is always an apprehended fixed A B, that even to my own apprehension is absolutely irreversible. Of course, our question is, What is the use of your *epigenesis* of a fixed order where a fixed order already *is*? In fact, does not the whole proposal of this vast and laborious *epigenesis* on your part originate in the mere assumption of an absolute absence of fixed order from the facts of sense, till said *epigenesis* should descend upon them? Of course, also, we cannot wonder that Kant, who has his whole triumphant edifice to save, should answer, Do not you see that, though the order is fixed and I grant perception in act *to be aware* of the fact of it, or to *assume* the fact of it (his “Wahrnehmen” or “Annehmen”), nevertheless, it is still in sense, wholly within, an affair of mere empirical sensation, and can, consequently, be no more than subjective, and, as subjective, contingent? And do not you see, further, that it is only another element from within, an intellectual element this time, a category, a single mesh in that wonderful *a priori* net (which I let into the *unity* of apperception as its systematic *many* of distribution)—do you not see that it is only such mesh can collect and focus that empirical, contingent, *a posteriori* many of sense into the unity and necessity of an object that is no longer mine, but, so to speak, its own, and, consequently, everybody's? Despite this answer, I hold Kant to remain uneasy and but half reassured. It is impossible to conceive that he did not say to himself, How, after all, am I myself to understand this

sense-necessity? Or how am I to say that, what must evidently be somehow known, even in consciousness, as a fixed and irreversible order of sense-succession, *if any correspondent category is to be moved to act*—how am I to say that this order, though fixed and irreversible, is still subjective and contingent, that is, reversible and unfixed? Again, this order, whatever it is, must, even in sense, be known: there is machinery provided for it, and, if this machinery is to act, it must necessarily become somehow aware of that on which it is to act. How, then, am I to say that an order that is fixed and irreversible comes to be known in *sense* and to *sense*? In fact, if there be already this fixed order beforehand, how can I say that it is the category alone gives it? How do I “perceive or assume” that the heat of the stone *always* follows the light of the sun, before I can say, the sun warms the stone? Am I to say that *only* after several consciousnesses of the conjoined sensations my category acts? In that case, suppose I am asked again, *How many* consciousnesses do you say are necessary? Will one, or two, or three, or a dozen—in short, *how many* of them will be sufficient? Does that number hold also in all other examples of the due empirical order? If not, why not? Let the required number be what it may also, must it not always terminate in a single conviction? Is not that single conviction this, that the heat always follows, never precedes, never *can* precede, the light? Is not that what you mean by the “logical” connection in the subject, through comparison of the two states, etc., while all is still sensuous, and the category has not yet even stirred?—and is it enough to call that an example of only a subjective and “hypothetical” judgment? The order is a mental conviction on perception of certain facts—subjective, if you like, but still a conviction due to the facts which *must* precede conviction due to the category; to these facts and that conviction what can a category that is something foreign to them, something else, and something from elsewhere, *add*, whether as regards insight into the facts, or certainty and assurance in the (first) conviction? To say subjective *then* and objective *now*, is it not only so much phrase? And “hypothetical”—how were facts, in such an order, in such a conviction, only hypothetical *then*?—or how are they categorical *now* that nothing, really nothing but words, has been at all added? Until conviction (your own “Wahrnehmen” or “Annehmen”), is

there not absence of every cue, clew, hint, motive, or reason, for the category to stir? Is it not that conviction that, so to speak, draws string and brings the category, the epigenesis, down? But, once having that conviction, can you honestly say that more, that the category, that the epigenesis, is required?

To my mind, Kant must have been long uneasy under such or similar self-questionings, and could only comfort or reassure himself by glancing again at that "whole of pure reason," and the need that lay for it in a matter of cognition that was only (his mistake) internal affection. That last consideration we must allow to have remained with him always, without a shadow of misgiving; and, allowing him that, we must allow him also sufficient justification for standing by his colors to the last. Had it not remained with him, it is just possible, so honest was he, that he would have renounced his epigenesis; as, surely, it is credible to everybody that, had he never entertained the one, he would never have thought of the other. Facts of sense are, as mere facts of sense, under every supposition, contingent; but, the moment they are allowed to concern an absolute independent world without, it is understood also how they may bring with them their own principles of nexus. When the dissolving sugar disappears in the water-glass, what is perceived, so far as sensation is concerned (on the retina of the eye), is only a white disappearing in a gray. Nevertheless, when objectively perceived, what is before me is a case of causality, and consequently of necessity. But it is not I—it is not any machinery of mine that has made, of a mere change of color, all these objective connections. There was no order in the colors that acted as a string to bring down upon them an epigenesis—a whole fixed system of arrangement from within me. Any arrangement that comes to be discovered belongs to the things themselves, of which the colors on my retina are mere signs. Any necessity, too, is theirs, and not mine. The necessity that is present, in fact, can, in many cases, be put into pound weights and absolute figures. The culvert that yields to a torrent is equal to so many hundred-weights, but the torrent is equal to so many more, and hence the yielding—the stoop of the balance. Imagination is imagination, of course, and must be allowed to say sugar and water, stones and mortar, etc., *may* change; but, despite imagination, the nature of things is once for all so. They

themselves are arranged according to substance and accident, cause and effect, reciprocity, etc. When I perceive them, I perceive also these. These are not only in me to be drawn down upon them. They are also in them. The world is once for all so made—once for all so made, but still a system of reason. I may, as well, *think* their necessity; but no thinking of mine can add a necessity to the facts which is not already in them. They may, indeed, not only be imagined to change, but actually change; there is contingency in the world; but the result is only a proof in place. You will not change the facts by changing the category, but you will change the category if you change the facts. So it is that Kant's theory can never come up to the facts of the case. Suppose the necessity we come to be aware of in the facts of sense were only hypothetical so far, it could not, any farther, be *made* categorical by supervention of a category. Such supervention could bring no new element to the facts as facts, it could not attach any further character to them that would not be extrinsic and adventitious. Any addition, in truth, beyond the facts would be simply illusion: is it for that, for mere deception, that we are to be endowed with such complicated categorical schema? If we are to have truth, then, the category must only agree with, it must not exceed the facts. The necessity of the category, consequently, is but a repetition of the necessity of the facts themselves. And that is the truth. The necessity is *there*—there in the facts, and not borrowed from me. Even on Kant's showing, the necessity is already there; for it is recognition of that necessity that rings the bell for the category. Turn the stop-cock right, and you lower the gas; left, and you raise it. It is vain to say I only saw a hypothetical necessity in the facts, until I let down my category upon them; it is vain to say *they* will *be* so and so, only so long as *I regard* them *as* so and so. All lies in facts, and *my regard* is simply beside them.

We can even fancy Hume shaking his head at Kant, and refusing to take from his hand what he held out to him in it as "voucher." That you hold out, Hume might have said, is something you call category; but, as quite adventitious and alien, I cannot conceive what new force it can lend to the facts, unless, just as in my own case, one of imagination. For this is evident, the law must either be in the facts, or in the category: if in the

facts, the category is idle ; if in the category, the law is fictitious, alien, and external, as only *imputed* to the facts. Or to take it in another way—in all cases of cause and effect, I allow that there is an inference made by the mind of *necessary connection*. Voucher for this I can find none but, philosophically, custom, and, naturally, instinct. I admit now that custom is not adequate to the apodictic necessity which I allow myself to be present ; but what would you substitute for it, what voucher do you propose in its stead ? The order in the facts of sense themselves is, for the most part, allowed by you to be already necessary. To show the voucher I want, then, it would be enough to show *how* we know as much as that. That *how* would be already the tie in the facts, and the consequent step in the mind of which I speak. Further, to admit (which, of course, in words you do not always, but which, for action of your category, you simply *must*) that necessity, and then to allege, as cause or voucher of it, a necessity which only follows it, a necessity which is in the second instance only when the other necessity precedes it in the first—this is simply to perpetrate an example of the preposterous proper. But, again, suppose we assume you to regard, as you sometimes do, the nexus in the facts of sense as only a “usual one,”¹ how are we to understand you overbid my proposition then (custom) ? My proposition then, of course, is what I now give up, the effect of what is “usual,” namely, on the association of ideas—a principle which, perfectly natural certainly, but merely contingent, can be made apodictic only by imagination. Mine, then, being a fiction of the imagination, can the voucher you offer be called anything else than a fiction of the understanding ? Rather, as I exalt “usual” into “apodictic” by the imagination, you so exalt it, not by understanding, but by an *imputation* of the understanding. Trusting to a certain analogy in the facts, you arbitrarily impose upon them the logical relation of antecedent and consequent ; without

¹ Kant usually talks very strongly of the order of causal *Erscheinungen* (even as *Erscheinungen*) being irreversible. Every *many* of sense, he says (II., 168) is a succession ; and it is only when he “perceives” (*wahrnimmt*) or previously assumes (*oder voraus annimmt*) that the order in the succession is one fixed by a rule, that he knows that he has before him an event (*Begebenheit*). Nevertheless (III., 62), a note rules that, however often we—and others—may have recognized the sun to warm the stone, the conjunction of perceptions remains only a “usual” one till the category acts.

any authority or guarantee whatever for either assumption or subsumption. No; I cannot see that (as you make it in that case) this mere reflection from a category on to my "usual" at all vindicates the latter into that grounded and substantial validity which an answer to the problem requires. The action of the category cannot be else than a mere reflection; it only lends a validity which the contingency, the mere usualness of the facts, forbids it fully, and legitimately, and assuredly to impart. The question is, "what is the warrant of the apodictic necessity that seems to be present in all cases of causality? My warrant may prove incompetent, but it is at least domestic. Whereas your warrant—epigenesis, or reflection (on hint of analogy) from another sphere—is at once incompetent and foreign. *Syngenesis* or *engenesis* is the only supposition adequate to the facts: *epigenesis* is in very name a fiction.

We may turn now to a word on Kant's own sense of the difficulties here. Various passages are to be found, for instance, which actually seem to admit, on his part, a certain unsatisfactoriness as concerns the categories of relation. He talks of these, indeed (II., 140), as "in themselves only contingent," as wanting "the immediate evidence" of the mathematical categories, as possessing their character of an *a priori* necessity only "mediately and indirectly" and "under condition of empirical thinking in an experience." This empirical condition seems, from page 168 (see preceding note), to be the *becoming aware* of the *empirical* rule. All objects, he tells us there, are, as syntheses of impressions, so many successions in time, "but so soon," he says, "as he perceives or assumes that in the succession there is a reference to the preceding state of things, out of which the immediate impression follows according to a rule"—then he knows that he has an event before him. We are told (p. 203) that the categories act "only by means of a universal *condition of sense*," and (p. 202) that consequently the category of causality would be empty "were the time left out in which something ensues on something else according to a rule." The power of the empirical element is signalized on page 737 too: "whether I can be *empirically* conscious of the sense-multiple as at the same time, or in succession, depends on circumstances or empirical conditions." He never forgets, however, even in these connections, to insist on the *ultimate* necessity

and objectivity as due to the category. On page 87 we learn that the notion of causality can never be inductively acquired, for what is usual can never amount to what is necessary, and the notion itself implies the necessity of an absolutely universal rule: "the effect does not merely attach itself to the cause, but it is occasioned by it and follows from it;" the cause (p. 185) is "something so constituted, that when it is, something else always and infallibly ensues on it." Such expressions contrast rather with the "usual" of the note just seen.

But, as might only be expected, it is in the *Prolegomena*, and not in the *Kritik*, that we are to find positive evidence of Kant vacillating as in presence of a difficulty which he is at length aware of. The two judgments (as commented on before) come at once in proof here. In that work he explains (p. 65) that the "logical conjunction," to which he refers as preceding the category, and as taking place in the sense-materials alone, is the process of comparison by which a character of generality, even so far, is added; the category only follows. Page 75, he says: "It is possible that there should be found in perception a rule of relation which prescribes that on a certain presentation of sense another (but not *vice versa*) should always follow." The necessity or universality, then, attributed to the facts, even in anticipation of the category, is in the above passages conspicuous. And we have just seen how Kant elsewhere seems to regard that necessary universal as no more than a "usual!" That is what the note on page 62 intimates of the subjective judgment in the case of the stone and the sun: "It is a mere judgment of perception, and contains no necessity, let me have ever so often experienced it, and let others have ever so often experienced it; the perceptions find themselves only *usually* so connected." When we compare these utterances, the vacillation they imply must be quite unmistakable; a nexus which was constant and infallible, etc., is now only "usual." But we have only to point to Kant's own reasoning (II., 87, and 728) to learn that what was only *usual* could be no cue or clew or hint to a necessity that was *apodictic*. The notion of a cause, he says, "absolutely demands that something A should be of such a nature that another something B follows out of it *necessarily and according to an absolutely universal rule*. It is quite evident, indeed, that whatever, *on these grounds*, Kant

urges against Hume's proposed explanation of causality, by the effect of custom, can, *on the very same grounds*, be urged against the order-clew in the subjective perceptions that Kant figures to precede action of the category, being anything less than already itself necessity, seeing that it is to be the precise cue and clew to necessity. Kant objects to Hume that, were necessity allowed to his mere custom, such necessity were only falsely *angedichtet*; and we, in the same way, can object to Kant that were his "subjective necessity" only a "usual," or were it only subjective in the sense of being only supposed, and not absolutely felt and known in consciousness as simply necessary, it could never pretend to be what it must pretend to be—an infallible cue and clew to his "objective necessity." As no subjective necessity, arising from frequency of association, could be allowed Hume as enough in explanation of an objective necessity, so nothing less than necessity of conviction, pure and simple, can be allowed Kant subjectively to precede application of his category objectively; in which case, evidently, the category at all were a piece superfluous. In fact, the necessity of Kant's category is quite as much *angedichtet* as the necessity of Hume's custom: it is quite as adventitious.

Enough now, on this head, whether as regards reasoning or quotation, has been probably accomplished; and, before proceeding to what are contemplated as the concluding considerations of this essay, I shall turn for a moment to a small point that is suggested in reference to Schopenhauer. This point concerns Schopenhauer's perpetually vaunted, but feeble and futile, theory of objectivity. That is to the effect that we perceive only our own internal affections, but we project them, as objects, into a time and space of our own, by virtue of our single category—causality. The affection, that is, being assumed as cause of its own self, becomes apparently projected, as an apparently independent object. How insufficient this is will appear at once, if we but consider, in this reference, the illustrations which we have just seen from Kant. The warmth of the room, the sweetness of the sugar, the bitterness of the wormwood, are certainly affections; but they remain such, and cannot possibly be projected as causes of their own selves. It is true we conceive the warmth to be objectively in the room, the sweetness objectively in the sugar,

and the bitterness objectively in the wormwood ; but still the room is the room—it is not warmth projected as cause of warmth ; the sugar is sugar—it is not sweetness projected as its own cause ; and so with wormwood and bitterness respectively. Room, sugar, wormwood, are even *other* sensations ; they are not those of warmth, sweetness, and bitterness. They are, in fact, not only other sensations, but groups of such. Now, in Schopenhauer's theory, there is no provision for the reference of one affection to any other than its own self ; and less, if possible, is there any provision in it for projecting a variety of sensations into groups of such in a new region of objectivity. With sensations of color, taste, etc., *and* the single category of causality, it is impossible to conceive of the objective construction of groups. Kant was well aware of that ; he, for his part, took care to have his mathematical categories in order to present us with objects at once sensible and, so to speak, stereoscopic, and also his dynamical categories in order to connect these objects, as well existentially the one to the other, as likewise in relative union to our faculties themselves. Kant's construction may show, in the end, as but an impregnation of the air on a bare mistake ; but it *was* a construction, and no mere random toss. Kant had reflected on what must go to make up a theory ; it is difficult to see that Schopenhauer ever reflected at all ; he dealt only in discontinuous and precipitate *propos*.

In disputing any position, it is always not only fair, but an absolute requisite for success, to set that position accurately in the light in which it was seen by its own promoter. Now, Kant's own most general word in this reference is his adduction of the standpoint of Copernicus. Borrowed from Hume (as I show elsewhere), it (p. 670) is to this effect : " Copernicus, not getting on well in explaining the movements of the heavens on the assumption that the entire starry host turned round the spectator, tried whether it would not succeed better with him if he supposed the spectator to turn and the stars to remain at rest." This, he intimates, is what in his own sphere he himself has attempted. If perception is to adapt itself to the object (this is the burden of his further remark), then all knowledge must be waited for, *must be a posteriori*, and *cannot* be *a priori* ; but an *a priori* knowledge becomes quite possible in idea, should the object have to adapt itself

to the perception (because then, plainly, the conditions to which it must adapt itself being discovered, would amount to *a priori* elements of actual perception). This, then, is the single Kantian point of issue, and if we withdraw it we withdraw at once all. Now, there is no question but that this point *is* withdrawn. Let our perception be submitted as it may to sensational signs, it is quite certain that it attains at last to a knowledge of an independent external universe which is in itself a rational system for our *exploitation*. So far, then, it is quite certain that Kant's idealism, like all subjective idealism, of what name soever, must perish or has perished. But still it is of interest to see how, even on its own terms, the system is inadequate and fails. That is, we shall grant the new Copernican position, with all that accompanies it, and let its own principles decide. Things, then, are only our own affections illusively alienated into the world which we fancy ourselves to perceive as external, independent, and its own. Still affection, or what we call sensation, is a thing wholly of its own kind, and independent of us. We cannot prescribe it, we cannot dictate to it, we must take it as we find it, and absolutely as we find it; *as such*, we cannot even modify it—receive it into, or dispose it in, whatever peculiar conditions of our own we may. We can say of it, then, only that it is as it is: for, so far as depends upon us, it might be infinitely different; it brings no principle of necessity with it. But such principles *are*: there is a ruled and regulated context of experience. Nay, such principles *must* be; for, all knowledge else being contingent, there could not possibly be any ruled and regulated context—anything we could call experience at all. These principles, then, are Kant's transcendental principles; or we may define them principles unavoidable in actual experience, and sufficiently verified by experience, but yet of a validity that, as universal and necessary, transcends, and cannot be derived from experience. This is a very accurate definition, and Kant thinks himself to occupy in what it indicates a position absolutely impregnable, whether as regards what is necessary or as regards what is contingent. We hold, of course, Kant to be wholly mistaken, and the two elements not to be separated in that way, the one from the other, like so much oil and water, but to be equally proper to, and inseparable from, the concrete, even as form and matter are. Kant, however, under pressure of his own

other supposition, was forced to discover a whole system of necessity within us that should cause an objective stringing together of the subjective sensations, to add itself to these as they came into us. That system was the furnishing of self-consciousness with twelve different functions of unity, to whose action on special sensation in the elements of time and space the whole said ruled and regulated context of experience was to be attributed. And now to apply, how all that lay before Kant's mind as an answer to Hume we may probably realize in this way. The rising of the sun and the warming of a stone are simply two contingent sensations, and as such they will always be contingent; nevertheless, I view them as necessary, because, all unconsciously, I have reduced them into a form within me. This form originates within me, as I say, all unconsciously. I have a certain logical function of judgment which is called antecedent and consequent. Now, that being *a priori* in my mind, and finding *a priori* in my mind a spectrum of the succession of time, cannot help amalgamating with a certain *modus* of that spectrum, which *modus* is in strict analogy with said logical function, and must attract it. This form within me, thus instinctively and unconsciously produced, at once seizes (through analogy) on such a succession as rising sun and warming stone, and raises it into the *felt necessity* of the intellectual function, at the same time that its own elements, as such, can only be regarded as contingent.

This is, undoubtedly, the gist of Kant's answer to Hume, and to the very quick of it. Nevertheless, it contains nothing that in the foregoing has not been met, and I am not required to repeat, whether as regards the one element or the other. I will only say this:

It is quite untrue that the schema is an *a priori* form there already in the mind, an *a priori* product, on the one hand, of an *a priori* category and, on the other, of *a priori* time. There is not any one schema under any one category due in any way or ways whatever to time at all. To talk of time even in any approach to this connection is simply *Andichtung*, simply false and groundless imputation. Under quantity, the schema is not any reference to time, but a glance at general objective form. Under quality, the schema is not any reference to time, but a glance at general objective matter. Under relation the schema is

not any reference to time, but a glance at several general objective connections. And of all these glances there is not one that is not merely empirical. In the three categories of relation, in especial, there is simply an assumption from experience of all that in experience the system is there to explain. In fact the whole credit of this *a priori* system is derived from the traffic with time—a traffic that, though a constant repetition of words in our ears, has not a vestige of foundation in fact. Only this traffic has been so deluding, and the enormous construction so imposingly laid out, with specious distinction after specious distinction, and plausible name after plausible name, that it was no wonder the brave, good, true, clear-minded, fertile-minded Kant took in, not the whole world (for we are “mostly fools”), but his own honest and perfectly transparent self. And having said this, we need not say what may be similarly said of the categories themselves, or any other of the main Kantian presuppositions. They are all alike—baseless contrivances (ingenious enough, laborious enough) towards the impossible realization of an equally baseless assumption.

KANT'S PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT.*

BY JOHN WATSON.

Still following the lead of formal logic, Kant, after considering the pure conceptions, goes on to consider the pure judgments of the understanding, or the fundamental propositions which formulate the unity of individual objects and the unity of their mutual connection. These judgments or propositions embody the last result of the investigation into the problem of critical philosophy in its positive aspect, viz.: How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? The materials for the final answer have already been given in the *Æsthetic*, taken along with the Deduction and Schematism of the categories, and little remains except to show in detail how the elements implied in real knowledge are joined together

* This article forms one of the chapters in a forthcoming work on “Kant's Theory of Knowledge.”